The existing source note cites the Copilot Cowork file-exfiltration story as more than prompt injection. The deeper issue is authority design: broad Graph access, automatic approvals, and sensitive files in one agent path.
Grey Haven reads this as blast-radius engineering. Enterprise agents need least privilege, scoped credentials, approval gates, data-loss controls, audit logs, and revocation paths from the start.
Operators should inventory what an agent can read, write, send, and approve before deployment, then constrain authority by task context.
The practical implementation test is whether the idea can survive handoffs, exceptions, and accountability. A useful operator memo should identify the workflow owner, the data source, the approval boundary, and the failure cost before automation expands. That framing keeps the signal grounded in production reality rather than launch rhetoric. It also gives investors and managers a cleaner way to compare vendors: not by fluency alone, but by how much controlled work the system can complete without creating cleanup elsewhere. Procurement teams should ask for sample logs, exception reports, and a named operating metric before a pilot begins. Product teams should document where human judgment remains necessary and how the system returns control when confidence drops, context is missing, or policy conflict appears. This creates a concrete adoption record that can be reviewed after the pilot instead of relying on anecdotal enthusiasm.
Watch for vendors that make permissions visible and adjustable without blocking every use case. Buyers will not trust agents that behave like interns with admin rights.
Source/provenance: Grey Haven Signal update linear-ASM-115-2, based on the existing Grey Haven source note.
